A formal top down model shall be presented to aid documentation and harmonization of information security requirements. The model formalizes layered development of information security, where top level abstract objectives, strategies and policies are step by step re ned into concrete protection measure speci cations. The model consists of static and dynamic parts, where static part refers to the organization, and dynamic part to the re nement of requirements. Major functions are horizontal and vertical harmonization functions used to transfer requirement into lower levels of abstraction, and to identify requirements of secure inter-operation of systems on each layer. Application of the model then consists of two parts: speci cation of the organization and speci cation of requirement harmonization functions.
INTRODUCTION
A formal top down model to harmonize and document information security requirements shall be presented. Development of information security within an organization is seen as a speci cation and enforcement of vertical and horizontal information security harmonization functions that are used to step by step re ne abstract top level information security requirements and objectives into more concrete protection measure speci cations. The model formalizes layered information security development, where the organization is divided into layers, each consisting of a set of administrative units. Based on upper layer requirements, unit speci c requirements and layer speci c requirements, total requirements on a given unit are speci ed by harmonization functions. Information security requirement here is any formal or informal statement about information security that the system should satisfy. The common approach shall be adopted, where information security refers to protection of three properties of information (ISO7498-2 1988 , ITSEC 1992 Con dentiality Information being accessible only to authorized entities. Integrity Information being altered or removed only upon an authorized request. Availability Information being accessible always when requested by an authorized entity
The fundamental goal of the model is to support speci cation and documentation of protection measures and operational procedures to enforce secure application of information systems. Components and functions of the model shall be speci ed formally to enable automated analysis of the target system. Formal speci cations can be used to specify and verify each re nement to assure from the enforcement of higher level policies (Williams & Abrams 1995) . Formal analysis is desirable also to follow the evolution of speci cation of protection measures from check lists to formal models (Backhouse & Dhillon 1996 , Baskerville 1993 . Formal presentation also supports the two major requirements of models in the development of trusted systems (Bell 1988) : Faithful presentation of the situation of interest, and formal analysis of the model. Several formal access control models exist for database security (see, for example, (Castano, Fugini, Martella & Samarati 1995) for a summary) but the model presented in this paper attempts to adopt a wider perspective towards information security by considering any information security requirement as input for the model taking into account that real life security requirements originate from many di erent sources and are not always clarly structured. Also, no exact grammar is given to the speci cation of an information security requirement. At this stage, an assumption is made that any requirement, whether presented formally or informally, can be analyzed according to the model. Due to the layered nature, the model is strongly related to hierarchies of information security policies. Layered information security policy concept shall be introduced in section 2. Based on layered security policies, the hierarchical development of information security, that the model formalizes, shall be discussed in section 3. This is also where an example is used to highlight the role of di erent layers. Formal speci cation for the model shall be given in section 4. Finally, conclusions shall be drawn and the directions for future research summarized in section 5.
LAYERS OF SECURITY POLICIES
The idea of establishing a harmonized framework for the development of information security within corporations started when studying the requirements that legislation should satisfy to provide an adequate protection against computer network crime (Leiwo 1995a , Leiwo 1995b . The need for a harmonized legislation in several nations, as for example the European Union is attempting to establish, lead to the identi cation of fundamental components of the hierarchical information security development. The model was rst described by a case, where the development of information security is divided into ve major layers, further divided into three categories, as illustrated in gure 1. Characteristics of categories are as follows:
Strategic Decision Category International and national objectives, standards, decisions, and guidelines establishing a harmonized framework for the information security development in several organizations. Requirements set at these layers are those that the operational environment sets to organization concerning protection of sensitive data and privacy of humans, or required or minimum level of security required in di erent transactions.
Organization Administrative Category Strategies and policies speci c to each organization, adapting international and national framework for the organization speci c needs and establishing a systematic approach for the development of information security within the organization. Requirements at this level are organization speci c and contain all requirements that are concerned with storage, processing and transmission of information within the organization or to external parties.
Implementation Category Specifying and implementing mechanisms to guarantee the adequate level of protection for systems to satisfy the corporation information security objectives. This is where required protection measures are implemented and operated. Requirements include requirements on implementation methods and tools and may require changes on upper level requirements in order to improve cost e ciency of protection and to ensure secure interoperation of di erent systems.
The division into categories is in uenced by the layered security policy concept (Abrams & Bailey 1995 , Olson & Abrams 1995 , Sterne 1991 where information security policy consists of three layers each representing di erent views to the system: Corporate Security Policy, Organizational Security Policy, and Technical Security Policy that can be further divided into sub policies according to the organization. Fundamental layers of policies can be described as follows:
Corporate Security Policy Laws, rules, and practices that regulate how assets including sensitive information are managed, protected, and distributed within a user organization. This level represents top management's view of the system. Organizational Security Policy Laws, rules and practices that regulate how an organization manages, protects, and distributes resources to achieve speci es security policy objectives. At this level, criteria should be de ned for conditions under which entities are allowed to access resources. This level represents system users view on the system. Technical Security Policy Laws, rules, and practices regulating the processing of sensitive information and the use of resources by the hardware and software on an IT system or product. This level represents system builders view of the system. This layer security policy approach is then considered in association with the conceptual information system meta model, named PIOCO (Iivari 1983 ). The meta model divides development of an information system into three levels that are used to analyze di erent levels of abstraction of the becoming system. The three levels of the meta model are pragmatic level (P), info-logical/organizational level (IO) and constructive/operational level (CO). Within this paper, these levels of abstraction have been adapted into the development of information security by roughly mapping them to t the categories where requirements of di erent abstractions of information security requirements are created, so that pragmatic level refers to strategic decision category, info-logical/organizational level Figure 1 Harmonized development of information security refers to organization administrative category, and constructive level refers to implementation category.
As establishment and enforcement of layered security policies refers mostly to the vertical harmonization within our terminology, the justi cation of horizontal harmonization is still open. Assume two separate secure systems, that need to inter-operate in a secure manner. As studied by, for example, (Gong & Qian 1994) , decision about security of interoperation is a computationally complex task. Due to this complexity, assurance of the security of interoperation shall be provided by enforcing harmonized re nements of security requirements at each layer of di erent systems security development by horizontal harmonization functions. Secure interoperation is approached by analyzing interoperability at each level of abstraction, and then harmonizing requirements between di erent units that need to inter-operate.
HARMONIZED DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION SECURITY
Within this section, the harmonized development of information security shall be described. Figure 1 illustrates a ve-layer case, that this analysis is based on. First two layers provide an external coordination, that shall be studied in section 3.1. Next two layers, Organization Layer and Business Unit Layer, are where the security management within an organization is enforced and shall be studied in section 3.2. Lowest layer, implementation of protection measures shall be studied in section 3.3. During the analysis, an example shall be given on the application of the approach into the European Union Directive concerning the protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data (EC-C277 1990) . Requirements of the directive shall be transferred throughout the development organization to highlight di erent tasks at each layer.
External coordination
Most information systems get their security requirements from outside, from, for example, laws and governmental decisions. These documents also provide organizations a base for security work. When developing information security within an organization, international and national standards, strategies, laws and other decisions must be taken as a starting point. They are needed to establish a framework for the corporation information security management. International strategies, for example, set components of information security, classi cation and evaluation of information security, general guidelines on the goals and requirements of security work and so on. When the security of global systems, where physically distributed components are located across national borders, the importance of international coordination of law increases. International coordination is required to avoid situations, where weaknesses and inconsistencies of nationally di erent juridical environments can be exploited either to use logical connectivity to commit a criminal act from a country having a weak legislation or use logical connectivity and target a system in a country having inadequate legislation.
The example directive speci es contents of law that each member nation should implement according to nation speci c characteristics. A generic speci cation is given on the contents of the required law with regard to acceptable processing and storage and required protection of personal data. Upper level requirements for nations are here the requirements set by the directive, that provides each country a harmonized base to establish their national law based on country speci c special features. Each of the high level requirements set by the directive must be considered nationally within each member country. This provides international organizations with the assurance of the critical topics being addressed by each member nation.
Organizational coordination
The management level, Organization Layer and Business Unit Layer within gure 1, is where the corporation information security work is coordinated. Based on the operating environment, the top management of the organization is responsible for specifying corporation security policies and strategies. Top management is responsible of the organization information security violations but is also authorized to establish policies and procedures that concern the entire organization. Management has to face two factors (Anderson, Longley & Kwok 1994) : The probability that the threat will eventuate, and the potential nancial outcome of the business impact. As it is not the responsibility of the security sta to make business decisions in the risk environment, it is essential that the management contributes actively to the security work.
Information security management within organization operates between those who set responsibilities and those who ful ll these requirements. Requirements are set by corporation (or business unit) management and ful lled by system users and developers. Two major obligations of the security management to the general management are to ensure that security requirements imposed on the system will adequately protect the organization's resources and data, and to ensure that the system is operated in a manner that satis es its security requirements (Bailey 1995) .
Corporations dealing with personal data must then set their security strategies and policies to take into account the requirements set by national laws concerning protection of personal data. As required by example directive, protection measures must be implemented against di erent threats against the data and guidelines must be established and enforced to control the ows of the information under the law. The protection requirements by law are the minimum requirements. It may be, that at some level, other measures required are stronger than those required by law. In this case, layer or unit speci c requirements over ride the upper level requirements, and a stronger security results. In the case of stronger requirements set by a speci c unit, horizontal harmonization is required to identify other units that co-operate with the unit with higher requirements. Requirements at these units must then be aligned with the unit having highest requirements to guarantee secure interoperability.
Implementation of protection measures
To guarantee consistent approach to the information security development, security mechanisms must be aligned with the corporation policies. Mechanisms must guarantee satisfaction of corporation general goals as well as satisfaction of the speci c information security requirements of di erent systems. Implementation layer is the nal step in the development of information security. It includes de nition, implementation and monitoring of the information security mechanisms. Two major requirements can be set for implemented controls and protection measures. They should be selected so that they can adequately counter the threats found during risk assessment, that means they enforce the security policy, and they should be implemented in a cost-e ective manner. Important factor is to not overestimate protection measures, security measure is e cient when it costs less than alternatives, including doing nothing.
Combination of several factors a ecting cost of protection results as a graph where costs are high now and in the far future, but as minimized as possible during the optimal time frame (Cohen 1995 ). An important factor reducing security of information systems is the lack of integration of security measures from the very early stages. No single design element, that may be operating system, application, or network, alone is capable of providing adequate security. Another controversial issue in the implementation layer is how to guarantee, that all informal requirements set at higher layers of the model, shall be transformed into the actual implementation of information security measures, that is enforcement of corporate information security policy.
When di erent requirements are harmonized at upper levels, di erent domains can be identi ed. Once implemented, the cost-e ectiveness can be improved by identi cation of similar functionalities and using same design and implementation documents in each case. Also, at this point similar requirements between di erent units can be horizontally harmonized to simplify the implementation, and hence improve cost e ciency.
THE MODEL
The harmonized development model for information security shall be studied in detail in this section. Static components of the model shall rst be speci ed in section 4.1. Based on these components, harmonization functions can be speci ed to provide comprehensive requirements of each unit. Section 4.2 studies harmonization functions in detail. Situations, where the model needs to be re ned, shall be studied in summarized 4.3.
Components of the model
The model can be presented as a 4-tuple (L; U; I; S) where L refers to layers, U to units, I to layer speci c requirements and S to unit speci c requirements. L = fL i ji = 1; 2; : : : Ng is layers L 1 to L N , L 1 being the top layer. Each layer L i consists of count(i) units U = fu i;j ji = 1; 2; : : : ; N; j = 1; 2; : : : ; count(i)g, where function count refers to the number of units on a given layer. I = fI i ji = 1; 2; : : : ; Ng are the layer speci c requirements of a layer L i . Unit speci c requirements are the set S = fs i;j ji = 1; 2; : : : ; N; j = 1; 2; : : : ; count(i)g.
All these components, L, U, I, and S are static, whereas other components of the model, requirements R, and harmonization functions and are dynamic.
Each unit u i;j 2 U on a given layer has its total requirements R i;j 2 R that are based on the previous layers' output, layer-speci c requirements, and unit-speci c requirements. An exact speci cation shall be given in equation 5, in section 4.2. The output from upper layers and identi cation of similar requirements within each layer establishes the harmonized approach for the information security development.
Vertical harmonization within each unit u i;j is enforced by two related sets, P arent U and Child U. They are speci ed so that the set P arent(u i;j ) = fu i?1;j 0g is the set of all those units fu i?1;j 0g that set requirements for the unit u i;j . Similarly, Child(u i;j ) = fu i+1;j 00g where the unit u i;j sets requirements for each unit in fu i+1;j 00g. For each layer L i , layer-speci c requirements, I i , can be speci ed to set requirements for each unit at that layer. To be adequately established, the model should satisfy three conditions: First, the division into layers should be complete, as speci ed in \Completeness of Layers" condition 1. Intuitively, this means that each unit u i;j 2 U should belong to a layer. Second, each layer should be unique, that means no unit can belong to more than one layer. This is determined by condition 2, \Uniqueness of Layers". The model should also satisfy is the \Uniqueness of Units" (condition 3) that says, that the the forming of units should be unique.
Condition 1 (Completeness of Layers) 8u i;j 2 Uju i;j 2 S N n=1 L n Condition 2 (Uniqueness of Layers) T N n=1 L n = ; Condition 3 (Uniqueness of units) 8u i 1 ;j 1 ; u i 2 ;j 2 2 Uj(u i 1 ;j 1 = u i 2 ;j 2 ) ) ((i 1 = i 2 )(
Harmonization functions
The two major functions within the model are vertical and horizontal harmonization of requirements. In the very essence, vertical harmonization means transformation of abstract upper layer requirements into more concrete lower layer requirements. Horizontal harmonization refers to the identi cation and harmonization of requirements that need to be similar within each unit on a given layer. The nature of vertical harmonization is interaction between units at di erent layers, whereas horizontal harmonization is interaction between units at same layer. Vertical harmonization, therefore, is the enforcement of the hierarchical development of information security, whereas horizontal harmonization is the enforcement of secure inter-operation of systems.
Each unit u i;j 2 U gets requirements R i;j 2 R as a result of requirements originating from upper layers fR 0 i?1;j 0ju i?1;j 0 2 P arent(u i;j )g, from unit-speci c requirements S i;j 2 S, and from layer-speci c requirement I i 2 I (see equation 5). Let : fR S Ig ! R be a set of vertical harmonization functions, speci ed in equation 1. Function i;j speci es the harmonization of requirements from unit u i;j to all units u i+1;j 0 2 Child(u i;j ). Vertical harmonization within the model refers to the identi cation of functions in a top-down fashion. The top down approach is required to provide an integral and formal approach to the speci cation or high level abstractions of requirements that can then be formally re ned. i;j (R i;j ; S i;j ; I i ) = R 0 i+1;j 0ju i+1;j 0 2 Child(u i;j )
(1)
As each unit may have more than one parent-units, and each unit may have several child-units, some of the requirements within each layer must be similar. Horizontal harmonization within the model is required to guarantee secure interoperability between units at same layer. Typically, di erent systems need to communicate between each other. Horizontal harmonization is required to guarantee that none of the links in the communication ow weakens the level of security under requirements set at the upper level. The basic form of horizontal harmonization is speci cation of layer-speci c requirements I, but in addition to that, identi cation of similar requirements originating from upper layers within a given layer may be required. A simple example of horizontal harmonization is specication of password protection of systems. The requirement to have password protection (if considered adequate) is a reasonable high level decision. Anyhow, it is not the duty of high level management to specify requirements on length, expiration, required structure, storage method, and other properties of passwords. For example, let us assume, that two di erent systems S 1 and S 2 need to inter-operate, and they have got a top level requirement of password based protection. If, for example, required length of a password in system S 1 is greater than required length at system S 2 , the communication requirement may violate the security level of S 1 .
To prevent such a violation, horizontal harmonization is a function to identify all requirements providing with requirements on same properties, like password length in the previous example and provision of horizontal harmonization function i at each layer L i . As the requirement is not speci ed, an assumption is made, that a requirement consists of two parts: identity and the actual requirement. Let the notation R 
Comprehensive harmonization, where total requirements R are speci ed, is done in two phases. First, vertical harmonization of upper layer requirements is carried out, and the output is then horizontally harmonized layer wise. The speci cation is given in equation 5. This is also illustrated in gure 2. R i;j = i ( i?1;j 0(R i?1;j 0; I i?1 ; S i?1;j 0)jR i?1;j 0 2 P arent(u i;j )) (5) 4.3 Re nement of the model Application of the model includes two tasks: modeling the organization, and speci cation and enforcement of harmonization functions. The organization is expected to be static whereas harmonization functions change more often. The following cases, are where the model should be re ned in order to maintain its validity:
1. Organizational change, for example appearance or disappearance of some units in organizational restructuring. 2. A change has occurred in some layer speci c requirements, requiring re nement of harmonization functions from that layer downwards. 3. A change has occurred in unit speci c requirements, requiring re nement of harmonization functions from that unit downwards. 4. Within the periodical re nement of information security within the organization.
The cost of change can easily be calculated according to the amount of changes needed to maintain the model. Obviously, organizational changes cost most since most factors of the model need to be re ned. Major re nements, like within periodical re nement of information security within organizations, the cost may be reasonable small but the frequency may increase the total cost. Again, automation can be used to reduce the cost of chances in static parts of the model.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A formal model has been presented to aid in documentation and harmonization of information security requirements. The model assumes a hierarchical, layered, information security development organization and speci es vertical and horizontal harmonization functions in order the establish cost e ective protection. Information security requirements originate from many di erent sources, and may be fragmented. Vertical harmonization provides each layer a common view of requirements established at upper layers, so protection measures can be as identical as possible. Horizontal harmonization identies similar requirements at each layer to provide a common approach towards them to simplify the implementation and maintenance, and to guarantee secure interoperability of di erent units within that layer.
The model itself acts as a starting point for further work. Once the formal model is established, di erent automation of speci cation and veri cation of requirements is enabled. There is a need to specify tools and methods to support harmonization, and to test the strength of the model in real life environments. Even though not done here, the model also enables formal analysis of di erent properties of the information security management itself, like the security of security management. If the organization can be modeled, then established access control and information ow models can be applied to give a formal speci cation for security properties of the organization.
Another essential topic of research is analysis of requirements. At this stage, no exact speci cation is given to the contents of requirements, rather the focus has been on the harmonization tasks. To get the most out of the formalism, an exact speci cation should be given to an information security requirement and re nement and dependencies should be analyzed according to the speci cation.
